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Abstract 
 
In Portugal, as worldwide, especially in the past decades, crime has become an issue of 
increasing interest both for society and researchers. The global growth of criminality 
had several repercussions in the prison system. The most direct one was the 
overcrowding of prisons. This situation required a great amount of investment to 
increase the capacity of Portuguese prisons. Simultaneously, the value for money 
associated with the prisons’ budget has turned itself more and more relevant. These 
circumstances together emphasize the importance of assessing the prisons’ performance. 
This study measures the efficiency of Portuguese prison facilities by means of the non-
parametric benchmarking approach of data envelopment analysis (DEA). However, due 
to the limitations of this technique, a bootstrap methodology is also applied in order to 
add more robustness to the results. Furthermore, a recent procedure is computed to 
evaluate congestion. The results show relevant levels of inefficiency in the Portuguese 
prison facilities, which represent an excess of several millions of Euros spent 
inadequately in this sector.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
European countries, mainly since the mid 1990’s, have faced a “threatening” growth of 
criminality, which have lead to a significant expansion of the prison population. 
According to Balassone et al. (2008) and based on Walmsley (1999 and 2007), the 
value estimated for prison inmates rise in Europe was about 17% for the period between 
1997 and 2006.  
 
In global terms, the Portuguese situation corroborates the European picture. Although 
not so markedly (between 1998 and 2003 criminality rose of 10% and after 2003 there 
was a slight decrease, as shown in figure 1 (INE, 2008). However, this only happened as 
a result of changes in the criminal law. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Crime rate recorded by police authorities in Portugal 
 
Many are the reasons pointed out by governors and researchers, among other 
stakeholders, to explain the global growth in criminality (Saridakis, 2004). In this sense, 
criminologists draw a distinction between ‘deterministic’ and ‘policy-driven’ 
explanations (Balassone et al., 2008). The former focus on issues related to the 
variations in the crime rate, demographic changes and social and economic 
determinants, including child poverty, family breakdown, poor education and 
unemployment. The “policy-driven” explanations consider the increase of prison 
inmates as a combination of changes in public attitudes towards imprisonment and more 
rigorous legislation, resulting in longer and severe sentences, although there is no 
evidence that these instruments are more effective in reducing crime. 
 
Like in other European countries, in order to deal with the growth of prison population 
(Walmsley, 2001), the Portuguese Government decided to build more prisons, boosting 
the capacity but, even so, not avoiding the inmates overcrowding in some particular 
cases (DGSP, 2009). Beyond the huge investments that were inherently associated, the 
simultaneous increase of the operational costs nowadays represents an important share 
in the State budget (Pratt and Maahs, 1999). 
 
All these circumstances, coming up together, transformed this sector into a significant 
issue for the Portuguese Government, pointing out the importance and the usefulness of 
measuring the performance of the Portuguese prison facilities (Gaes et al., 2004). 
Besides identifying the benchmarks in the sector, this kind of analysis can instigate 
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(fundamentally) the (inefficient) prisons to become more efficient, which is of great 
relevance concerning all the (monetary) resources involved in this sector (Avio, 1998). 
One of the most successful methodologies of performance evaluation consists in the 
application of the non-parametric benchmarking technique of data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). This methodology, being a mathematical programming technique, develops an 
(efficient) frontier to which each prison is compared, obtaining from that comparison its 
relative efficiency. It has the advantage of letting data “speak by itself” because unlike 
parametric techniques, such as stochastic frontier analysis, it does not rely on any 
specific functional form. Moreover, DEA deals easily with multiple inputs and outputs, 
points out the targets for each variable and allows for the identification of a group of 
efficient organizations (prisons in this case) to each inefficient organization with a 
similar combination of inputs and outputs. 
 
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. The first one is related to the 
performance evaluation of prison facilities itself since so few examples appear in the 
literature. The second contribution concerns the application of recent non-parametric 
techniques regarding the efficiency measurement and the evaluation of the congestion 
phenomenon, respectively the bootstrap and Tone and Sahoo approaches. And, finally, 
this study might be useful for the Portuguese prison sector to improve its performance 
as well as for other countries worldwide. After this brief introduction, the paper 
reviewed the major studies on performance evaluation of prisons found in the literature. 
Next, the prison system in Portugal is characterized followed by the description of the 
methodologies adopted and the presentation of the results of their application. 
Afterwards, the results are discussed and analyzed. The study ends with the most 
important conclusions. 
 
 
2. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on performance evaluation is not very abundant. Without taking into 
account partial productivity methods, like performance indicators, the number of 
performance studies is scarce. We only found seven studies, five in academic journals, 
one as a book chapter and the other as a working paper.  
 
In terms of the techniques adopted, the study of prison’s performance diverges evenly 
between the utilisation of parametric and non-parametric approaches. Until now, three 
studies (Trumbull and Witte, 1981, Panci, 1999, Gyimah-Brembong, 2000 and 
Balassone et al., 2008) were developed applying parametric methods. Trumbull and 
Witte (1981) estimated a cost function for a sample of 6 federal correctional institutions 
in the US between 1976 and 1978. Panci (1999) estimated both a production and a cost 
function for a sample of 107 Italian prisons in 1996. Both studies followed a simple 
regression approach (Feldstein, 1967) and do not report estimates of an efficiency 
frontier. In addition, Panci (1999) presented some indicators for individual prisons 
comparing them with an efficient frontier. 
 
Gyimah-Brembong (2000), adopting a cost function approach, evaluated the 
performance of prisons in Florida for the year 1997/98. In addition, the author 
encompasses in this analysis the treatment of the operational environment through 
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variables as the health care personnel per inmate, the age of the prison and the ratio of 
black inmates. Like in other studies, relevant signs of inefficiency were found. 
 
More recently, Balassone et al. (2008) analyzed an unbalanced panel of 142 Italian 
penitentiaries for the time period 2003-2005. Using a stochastic cost frontier analysis, 
they determined significant technical inefficiency levels, mainly attributable to 
overstaffing. The chief source of inefficiency is identified in unexploited economies of 
scale. Both average prison size and technical efficiency are smaller in the South of Italy 
than in the rest of the country. All studies found out significant economies of scale in 
their samples. 
 
Regarding the non-parametric approaches, only Ganley and Cubbin (1992), Butler and 
Johnson (1997) and Nyhan (2002), in some way, evaluated the performance of prison 
facilities. All of them applied the DEA model. Ganley and Cubbin (1992) estimated the 
technical efficiency of 33 UK local prisons and remand centres for the financial year 
1984/85. They determined an average technical inefficiency equal to 0.88 (assuming 
variable returns to scale). The chief cause of inefficiency was associated with the excess 
of staff. 
 
Butler and Johnson (1997) developed their study not only to demonstrate the usefulness 
of DEA in evaluating the performance of justice administration, but also to measure the 
efficiency of 22 Michigan Prisons with 1992 data. That application was used to see 
which prisons were inefficient, providing some insights into the service supplied and 
identifying targets for performance levels. 
 
The studies of Ganley and Cubbin (1992) and Butler and Johnson (1997) use similar 
output considerations, diverging by the number of prisoner days in a year in Ganley and 
Cubbin (1992) and the yearly number of prisoners confined per facility in Butler and 
Johnson (1997). The major differences between them regard the inputs, whereas Ganley 
and Cubbin (1992) only used expenditure data as proxies for inputs, separating labour 
expenses from other costs, Butler and Johnson (1997) employed direct measures of the 
quantity of inputs (number of staff and number of beds) together with the total 
expenditure.  
 
Finally, Nyhan (2002) used DEA to evaluate de performance of 35 juvenile justice 
facilities in the state of Florida in US. In addition to the determination of the efficient 
facilities and the estimation of targets for the inefficient ones, the authors promoted a 
comparison between the state-operated and privately contracted facilities. Privately 
contracted facilities show a slightly superior performance when compared with the 
state-operated ones. 
 
 
3. PORTUGUESE PRISON SYSTEM  
 
3.1   Institutional framework 
 
The Portuguese prison facilities are under the supervision of the Directorate General of 
Prison Services (DGSP), which constitutes an auxiliary body of the judiciary 
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administration (part of the Ministry of Justice). Although DGSP has administrative 
autonomy, it stays under the State's direct administration, following the organic law of 
DGSP stated in Law no. 125 of 2007. 
 
The DGSP has the task of managing the prison system (guiding services of arrestment 
and execution of punishments; supervise the prison’s organization and operation), 
ensuring life conditions compatible with human dignity and contributing to the public 
order and social peace through the maintenance of community safety and creating 
conditions for social reintegration of inmates, allowing them to lead their life in a 
socially responsible way. Moreover, DGSP has also the attribution of conducting 
studies and investigations regarding the treatment of offenders. 
 
Under the management of the DGSP, the Portuguese prisons are distinguished 
according to three different classifications, such as security level, internal organisation 
and availability of services and facilities (Eiras, 2007). These classifications are 
presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Classification of the Portuguese prisons 
Internal Organisation Security* Services and facilities 
Central Maximum Medical services 
Special Closed Vocational training 
Regional Open Labour occupation 
 Mixed Education 
  Sport and socio-cultural activities 
* The classification of establishments’ security is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice, upon 
proposal of the Director-General; 
 
The prison facilities are designed to take prisoners into custody and execute the 
punishments complying with all security measures. In Portugal, there were 50 prisons in 
2008, divided in 17 Central prisons, 4 Special prisons and 29 Regional prisons. Their 
classification depends on the length of the inmates’ sentence. The Central prison’s 
responsibilities comply with custodial measures longer than 6 months; while the Special 
prison’s attribution relies on internment of inmates in need of special care, that is, 
young adults up to 25 years, women and sick inmates, the latter integrated in prison 
hospitals. Finally, the Regional prisons deal with preventive or inmates sentenced to 
terms not exceeding 6 months. Note that Regional prisons are financially dependent on 
the central services. 
 
Figure 2 presents the geographical distribution of prisons facilities in the Portuguese 
territory (DGSP, 2009).  
 
Given the geographical distribution of the judicial districts (according to the division of 
the courts in XIX century) and the prison facilities location (also largely a reflection of 
the past), each district court has the following distribution of prison facilities: i) Oporto: 
14 prisons; ii) Coimbra: 11 prisons; iii) Évora: 10 prisons and iv) Lisbon: 15 prisons. 
 
 
 
6 
3.2 Prison service in numbers 
 
In 2008, the prison facilities available had the capacity to deal with 12,294 prison 
inmates. This means that, unlike before 2006, in global terms, the inmates overcrowding 
was no longer observed, as it is demonstrated in figure 3 (based on INE, 2008). The 
population in Portugal in that year was about 10.7 million. The decrease of inmate 
population since 2005 cannot be explained by a reduction of criminality but due to a 
reform in penal law, e.g. with the implementation of domiciliary detentions.  
 
Figure 2 – Geographic distribution of Portuguese prison facilities 
 
 
Figure 3 – Number of prison inmates and establishments and their capacity 
 
Central Prisons 
Special Prisons 
Regional Prisons 
Female Prison 
Unisex Prison 
7 
Regarding the female inmate population, there was a slight reduction in quantity terms. 
Indeed, the volume of women inmates, which was stable at 7% since 2003, in 2008, 
decreased to 6%. 
 
As far as foreigners are concerned, nowadays they represent 20.3% of the inmate’s 
population (DGSP, 2009). Notice that foreign inmates have grown gradually. In 
particular, since 2001 until the end of 2008, they increased 8.4%. Regarding their 
origins by continent, Africa with 57.6%, particularly the Portuguese-speaking African 
countries, is in the first place, followed by Europe (23.7%), particularly those of 
Spanish, Romanian and Ukrainian origins. Finally, South America (17.4%) comes third, 
where the natives of Brazil and Venezuela surpass all other nationalities. 
 
In global terms, the prison population has low educational levels. This is expressed by 
the fact that more than 10% of the inmates have no schooling at all and 60% of the 
remainder inmates only have the lower levels of basic education (DGSP, 2009). 
 
Questions related to deaths and security in Portuguese prisons have been a matter of 
struggle by the Authorities in charge. As a result, there was a reduction in the number of 
deaths and escape attempts by inmates. The number of deaths (68 for 2008) decreased 
year after year since 2003 and remained always below one hundred. It is worth taking 
into account the health conditions that the majority of inmates show where they enter 
the prison facility, the morbidity of the diseases involved and the volume of people who 
are reported (considering the prison population incoming and outgoing each year). This 
circumstance reflects a great effort that the prison services have made in improving 
medical care and assistance to the prison population. 
 
3.3 Performance assessment and accountability 
 
In 2008, the Portuguese Government reformed the Public Administration and, among 
other aspects, compelled public services to (self) evaluate their performance. This plan, 
the Assessment Framework and Accountability (QUAR), has the goal of not only 
identifying the best practices in the sector and instigating the prison service to become 
more efficient, but also of creating a tool capable of inducing responsibility in their 
managers. In this regard, DGSP defined five main objectives for the Justice area in 
Portugal, namely: 
 
1. Optimizing the main mission of DGSP; 
2. Improving the functioning of the prison and simplifying the procedures; 
3. Upgrading and enhancing the human resources; 
4. Modernizing the material and technological resources; 
5. Reforming the prison park. 
 
In this sense, the Portuguese prisons, to achieve the strategic objectives mentioned 
above, have drawn 6 operational objectives, diverging, however, in the number of the 
performance indicators (encompassing the different domains of effectiveness, efficiency 
and quality). Those performance indicators are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 – Objectives and performance indicators adopted for Portuguese prisons 
Objective / Indicator Target Real 
value 
Degree of 
fulfilment 
Obj1.  Increase by 10% the number of inspections and searches in prison 
facilities 
102 123 121% 
Obj2. Increasing occupancy rates and labour integration of inmates by 
2.5%, in order to improve their social reintegration 
355 366 101% 
Obj3. Increase by 5% the rate of implementation of the Individual 
Rehabilitation Plan (PIR) to inmates condemned 
25 42 126.9% 
Obj4. Increase the occupancy rate in school activities / training of 
prison population by 2.5%, to enhance their personal and social 
skills 
47 76 162% 
Obj5. Reduction in 10% of the average time for completion of prisoners 
investigation 
37 30 119% 
Obj6. Reduce by 10% the average time of the goods purchasing process 9 6 133% 
 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 DEA 
 
The deterministic methodology of DEA is a non-parametric benchmarking technique 
that uses linear mathematical programming to construct an efficient frontier in order to 
assess the relative performance of organizational units (prison establishments in this 
case). As a non-parametric approach, instead of assuming a function to the production 
or cost frontier (as in parametric methods), the frontier is constituted by the best 
practices observed in the data set. Therefore, it does not need a prior specification for 
the weights of each input and output, neither does it require judgments on the 
production or cost function form. In the presence of an industry with multiple inputs and 
outputs, the technical efficiency of each operator is assessed by the distance that 
separates each one from the frontier, that is, by the potential savings obtained by 
reducing the inputs for the same level of outputs (input orientation) or, vice-versa, by 
the maximization of outputs for the same level of inputs consumed (output orientation).  
 
The primary model, developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 (Charnes et al., 
1978), is commonly known as CCR or CRS model, since it assumes constant returns to 
scale for the production (cost) technology. It can be formulated as a liner program, to 
which the relative efficiency of the organizations is obtained. For an input orientation, 
we have: 
 
                                        mθmin                                                                                    (1) 
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                0
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Where, m is the index representative of each prison facility, θ is the value obtained for 
the technical efficiency, x and y correspond to (l) inputs and (t) outputs, respectively, 
and λ their associated weights. 
 
Few years later, in the 80s, Banker et al. (1984) introduced the possibility of variable 
returns to scale (VRS), named BCC or VRS model, by adding to algorithm (1) an 
additional constraint 1=∑λ . Gathering DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC models allows for 
the computation of scale economies which measure the influence of size on efficiency. 
Like this, the technical efficiency (TE, obtained from CCR model) can be decomposed 
into pure technical efficiency (PTE, attained by BCC model) and scale efficiency (SE).     
 
4.2 Bootstrap 
 
DEA is not a panacea for benchmarking, since both technical and practical limitations 
exist (Nyhan, 2002). Besides being extremely sensitive to outliers, DEA does not 
determine the relative differences among efficient prisons (Simar and Wilson, 1998). 
So, in order to mitigate some of those limitations and to confer robustness to the results, 
a DEA-bootstrap methodology, as proposed by Simar and Wilson (vide Fried et al., 
2008), was applied.  
 
In basic terms, the bootstrap consists in the replication of B times the traditional DEA 
with random data obtained from the real data. One will be determining, each time, a 
particular imaginary frontier that corresponds to a specific set of peers (which works as 
a benchmark for each prison), representing a particular level of non-observable or non-
included variables.  
 
4.3 Evaluation of the congestion phenomenon 
 
The congestion phenomenon has been studied over time through the application of 
diverse techniques, namely Fare et al. (1985), Cooper et al. (1996) and Tone and Sahoo 
(2004) approaches (for more details about the different congestion approaches see 
Simões and Marques, 2009). Although there is divergence of perceptions between them 
about the best way to compute congestion, its definition remains untouchable, that is, 
“after a given value the increase in inputs can lead to a decrease in outputs or, vice-
versa, a decrease in outputs can lead to an increase in inputs”. We opted to apply in this 
research the most recent one, that is, Tone and Sahoo approach which a priori, has more 
advantages.  
 
Tone and Sahoo approach, a new two-stage method, measures the phenomenon 
congestion using the slacks-based measure (SBM) in the second stage (Tone, 2001). 
The SBM formulation (in an output orientation) is given by: 
 
max            ∑∑
=
−
=
+
+
l
i im
i
t
k km
k
x
c
ly
c
t 11
11
ε                                                                         (1) 
 
Here +kc  and 
−
ic  correspond to the existence or not of congestion, respectively, and ε is 
an Archimedean value.  
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Tone and Sahoo approach distinguishes between strong and weak congestion. In a 
practical view, the former corresponds to the congestion of all inputs whereas the latter 
occurs when not all the inputs are congested. Other advantage of Tone and Sahoo 
approach is to establish a relationship between scale economies and congestion. The 
scale diseconomy (ρ) can be determined by the ratio between the change in y by the 
change in x. Therefore, it measures the potential increase in output from eliminating the 
congestion of inputs. However, this is true only for the case of existence of strong 
congestion (ρ < 0).   
 
 
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
5.1 Model specification and data 
 
Considering the provision of prison services, since the unique objective is the 
minimization of the resources consumed (and obviously not the instigation of the 
criminality and consequently the number of prison inmates) for a quality pattern 
established (Aubyn, 2008), it induces the clear-cut idea of adopting an input orientation 
for the model. This research was carried out with a set of data from 47 Portuguese 
prison facilities relative to the year 2007. The data was obtained from DGSP annual 
reports and questioning people with high knowledge of the sector.  
 
In line with the literature (Ganley and Cubbin, 1992, Butler and Johnson, 1997), the 
model specification encompass two outputs, respectively the number of inmates in 
Portuguese prisons and the number of inmates that had participated in training 
programmes (institutional programmes and/or labour occupation) and two inputs, that 
is, the number of staff (from administration functions to the prison guards) and the 
operational expenses of the prison establishment (being subtracted the costs 
corresponding to the prison staff). The basic statistics for each variable are given in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 - Model statistics 
 Mean Str. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
INPUTS      
Operational Expenses (€) 737,968 713,015 354,651 185,759 3,306,000 
Staff (no.) 114 83 69 33 337 
OUTPUTS      
Inmates (no.) 258 253 137 32 988 
Inmates in training 
programmes (no.) 161 153 103 11 687 
 
5.2 DEA results 
 
As referred to before, two models, CCR and BCC, were computed in order to evaluate 
the performance of the Portuguese prisons. Notice that the performance results obtained 
from CCR model correspond to the TE and the PTE is determined by the BCC model. 
The SE is determined by the ratio between TE and PTE. Table 4 displays the summary 
of the main results obtained for the Portuguese prison facilities. 
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Table 4 - Results for the Portuguese prison facilities 
Type  Prison CRS VRS SE 
Central 1 Alcoentre 0.856 0.860 0.995 
 2 Carregueira 0.790 0.793 0.997 
 3 Caxias 0.141 0.306 0.461 
 4 Coimbra 0.567 0.573 0.990 
 5 Funchal 0.605 0.611 0.991 
 6 Izeda 0.611 0.621 0.985 
 7 Linhó 0.601 0.620 0.968 
 8 Lisboa 0.686 0.694 0.989 
 9 Monsanto 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 10 Paços de Ferreira 0.177 0.298 0.594 
 11 Pinheiro da Cruz 0.741 1.000 0.741 
 12 Porto 0.943 0.945 0.998 
 13 Santa Cruz do Bispo 0.881 1.000 0.881 
 14 Santarém 0.664 1.000 0.664 
 15 Sintra 0.167 0.569 0.293 
 16 Vale de Judeus 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Special 17 Leiria 0.864 0.870 0.994 
 18 Santa Cruz do Bispo 0.560 0.575 0.973 
 19 Tires 0.414 0.425 0.975 
Regional 20 Angra do Heroísmo 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 21 Aveiro 0.668 1.000 0.668 
 22 Beja 0.529 0.698 0.758 
 23 Braga 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 24 Bragança 0.491 0.829 0.592 
 25 Caldas da Rainha 0.673 0.923 0.729 
 26 Castelo Branco 0.458 0.622 0.737 
 27 Chaves 0.492 0.905 0.543 
 28 Coimbra 0.710 0.770 0.922 
 29 Covilhã 0.472 0.658 0.717 
 30 Elvas 0.486 0.864 0.563 
 31 Évora 0.390 0.731 0.534 
 32 Faro 0.446 0.577 0.773 
 33 Guarda 0.720 0.770 0.935 
 34 Guimarães 0.574 0.814 0.705 
 35 Lamego 0.494 0.817 0.605 
 36 Leiria 0.794 0.859 0.924 
 37 Montijo 0.451 0.532 0.849 
 38 Odemira 0.752 1.000 0.752 
 39 Ponta Delgada 0.967 1.000 0.967 
 40 Setúbal 0.638 0.657 0.972 
 41 Silves 0.669 0.880 0.761 
 42 Torres Novas 0.536 1.000 0.536 
 43 Viana do Castelo 0.464 0.798 0.582 
 44 Vila Real 0.600 0.796 0.754 
 45 Viseu 0.612 0.791 0.774 
 46 PJ Lisboa 0.753 0.913 0.825 
 47 PJ Porto 0.314 0.950 0.330 
  Average 0.626 0.785 0.794 
  Standard Deviation 0.229 0.199 0.194 
  Median 0.605 0.793 0.881 
  Minimum 0.141 0.298 0.293 
  Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
The inefficiency levels of Portuguese prisons for the year 2007 were meaningful. The 
average TE value was 0.626. In Portugal, the prison facilities show average potential 
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savings of TE of about 37%. This means that, on average, each prison could reduce the 
inputs consumed by 37%, i.e., they could reduce their number of employees and 
expenses in the percentage referred to by dealing with the same number of inmates and 
training programmes. It would correspond to a saving of about 12 million of euros in 
that year and an average reduction of about 1,650 employees. 
 
5.3 Analysis of results 
 
5.3.1 DEA 
 
The DEA results have shown that the prisons of Monsanto, Vale de Judeus, Angra do 
Heroísmo and Braga are the most efficient ones, in opposition to the prisons of Caxias, 
Paços de Ferreira and Sintra which are remarked for being the most inefficient ones. 
 
Only considering the scale effect, if prisons could operate at an optimal scale, it would 
represent a reduction of input consumption of about 20%. From the 47 prison 
establishments, 38 of them present increasing returns to scale, 5 decreasing returns to 
scale and 4 CRS. 
 
When the DEA results are disaggregated according to the organisation level of the 
Portuguese prisons, such as Central Prisons, Regional Prisons and Special Prisons, the 
Regional ones stand out as the most efficient and, as expected, the Special prisons as the 
less efficient ones. This can be observed in Figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4 – CRS and VRS efficiencies for Central, Regional and Special prisons 
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Different types of analysis can be drawn from these results. For instance, the better 
results of the Regional prisons can be explained through their less complex service, that 
is, the most dangerous inmates are sent to the central prisons, and, the most particular 
and troublesome cases, to the Special prisons. This, inevitably, could mean that the 
Central and, particularly, the Special prisons require more resources. However, if the 
scale effect is considered (by means of CRS model) there is some balance between the 
savings originated in a more optimal scale and the increasing of costs due to the great 
intricacy of the prisons.  
 
5.3.2 Bootstrap 
 
The results obtained from the application of the DEA-bootstrap-VRS model are 
displayed in Figure 5. A 95% confidence level interval and a B of 2000 were adopted. 
 
 
Figure 5 – DEA-bootstrap-VRS model results 
 
The results revealed inefficiency levels higher than the ones obtained by the DEA 
model. The prisons are, on average, about 29% per cent inefficient using the DEA-
bootstrap-VRS model (about 41% in DEA-CRS model). Nevertheless, it should be 
noticed that the extreme values (best and worst practices) in the Portuguese prisons are 
generally the same.  
 
5.3.3 Congestion 
 
The congestion results obtained from Tone and Sahoo approach are presented in Figure 
6, embracing both the values of congestion and scale diseconomies per prison facility. 
 
It shows signs of congestion for Portuguese prisons ranging between 3.2% (considering 
all the prisons) and 5.6% (only for the congested ones). As can be observed, 27 prisons 
revealed congestion inefficiencies, such as the prisons of Alcoentre, Carregueira, 
Castelo Branco, Caxias, Coimbra, Funchal, Izeda, Linhó, Monsanto, Pinheiro da Cruz, 
Santarém, Vale de Judeus, Leiria, Santa Cruz do Bispo, Aveiro, Bragança, Caldas da 
Rainha, Coimbra, Covilhã, Faro, Guarda, Lamego, Leiria, Montijo, Setúbal, Vila Real 
and Viseu. 
 
In addition, as abovementioned, the Tone and Sahoo approach also enables us to 
evaluate scale diseconomies, via parameter ρ. In practical terms, it means that if a 
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decrease of 1% exists in congested inputs, the outputs production has, on average, a 
potential improvement of about 1.6% (in this case). 
 
 
Figure 6 – Congestion inefficiencies and scale diseconomies 
 
Corroborating the results obtained by DEA, we observe higher levels of congestion in 
Central and in Special prisons, which is directly related to the excess of resources in 
their organisational structure. Figure 7 shows the congestion inefficiency level per 
organization type of prisons.  
 
 
Figure 7 - Congestion inefficiency level per organization type of prisons 
 
These results were as expected, since it would be predictable that the major prisons with 
higher complexity and more managerial difficulties would have the most intense signs 
of congestion.   
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The accomplishment of this study proves once again the importance that benchmarking, 
in general, and the application of these models, in particular, might have to help the 
managers to make decisions. Prison officials and state administrators can use the 
information obtained by DEA to improve the allocation of resources among the prison 
facilities and their utilization, especially since we are dealing with public money. As 
prison facilities represent public entities extremely costly to the State, the promotion of 
efficiency and innovation principles in their administration is essential. 
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In recent years, the prison sector has gone through some reforms which have increased 
the interest and importance of this kind of studies in Portugal, trying to determine the 
best way of providing this service. This research evaluated the performance of 47 
Portuguese prisons through the non-parametric frontier method of DEA, pointing out 
significant levels of inefficiency. 
 
For example, using CRS and VRS models we estimated an average level of 37% and 
21% of inefficiency for the Portuguese prisons, respectively. Besides, if prisons 
operated at an optimal size, they would be able to save about 20% of their costs (inputs 
consumed) for the same quantity of outputs produced. In addition, on average, prison 
facilities showed increasing returns to scale. 
 
In particular, if the scale effect is eliminated (applying the VRS model) as it would be 
expected a priori, Regional prisons revealed better performances when compared with 
the Special and Central prisons. This might be explained by the fact that these facilities 
deal with less troublesome cases, since the more complicated ones are transferred to the 
Central and Special prisons.  
 
Another objective of this paper was to find out the influence of the congestion 
phenomenon in the prison efficiency. To fulfil it, we computed the recent TS approach. 
This approach highlighted signs of congestion of 3.2% and 5.6% when the whole set of 
Portuguese prison facilities is considered and when only the sample of the congested 
ones are taken into account, respectively.  
 
According to this approach, 27 Portuguese prisons show signs of congestion. Therefore, 
for these prisons, the results should constitute an alert regarding the expansion of their 
services. Although more research is required, especially in the presence of congestion 
signs, when technical inefficiency is computed, there are consequences that cannot be 
disregarded. 
 
The application of benchmarking in prisons may be used by the managers to establish 
budget targets, avoid personal excess, provide a basis for contract renewal or 
termination, and assist in developing strategies for improving the performance of 
inefficient providers. Rankings as outcomes of benchmarking exercises may also be 
very useful for this purpose. Policy makers will need improved analytic tools to enhance 
decision making, where DEA and other new robust methods might have an important 
role addressing this need, providing managers with means to reveal the efficiency of 
existing programs, to highlight their need for greater resources, or to justify downsizing 
strategies. 
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